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Compressors and pumps are amongst the most common sources of leaks in hydrocarbon 
processing facilities. Preventing leaks is the task of maintenance and inspection programs. 
Ignition sources are difficult to eliminate given the low ignition energy for most gases. So, when 
leaks occur, explosions and fires often follow. It is then the task of flame detection systems to 
sound the alarm quickly and possibly activate automated response systems. 
 
The design of these detection systems is of critical importance. Owners and operators need to 
have confidence in the system and its ability to quickly identify fires in the area of interest. This 
requires conducting a geographic coverage assessment, preferably aided by well-designed 
software tools, to calculate coverage levels and identify any concerning gaps in coverage. 
The authors present a case study where-in the detector layout of a proposed compressor house is 
assessed and optimized using 3D modeling. The assessment process and results are reviewed to 
highlight important aspects of the process and key outcomes. 
 
Keywords: Case Study, Compressor, Fire, Normally Unoccupied Facility, Fire detection, Flame 
detection, Loss prevention 
 
Introduction 
Leaks from high pressure gas compressors are a common and potentially devastating occurrence. 
Compressor houses are typically sources of heightened concern for operators because they 
combine key risk factors. Hydrocarbon vapors are present at very high pressures with multiple 
potential leak locations packed into a relatively small geographic space. The typically high level 
 
 
of congestion around the compressors further increases the risks associated with high pressure jet 
fires and vapor cloud explosions by making fire propagation and flame acceleration more likely. 
Even the best and most proactive preventative maintenance and monitoring programs at occupied 
facilities will not always succeed in keeping high pressure flammable gases and hydrocarbon 
liquids contained within the process equipment. When leaks occur, it is generally safe to assume 
that the resulting fuel-air mixture will eventually find an energy source sufficient for ignition. 
This can occur near the point of release, but this is often not the case and the consequences are 
generally far more severe when it is not. Where there are leaks fires and explosions will occur. It 
is the task of fire and gas detection systems to sound the alarm as quickly as possible and initiate 
mitigation systems, minimizing the resulting damage. 
 
Fires and explosions tend to wake the neighbors, if there are any, and get the attention of local 
and sometimes national media - sometimes the attention of the US Congress as well. The rapid 
and effective operation of shutdown and blow down systems in compressor houses has the 
potential to not only limit losses and minimize downtime for repairs, but also make the operator 
look a lot better when the story hits the papers. Such was the case with a 2013 compressor station 
fire at a Williams facility in Pennsylvania. The role that automated safety systems played in 
mitigating the release and explosion received significant attention in an otherwise brief article 
that appeared in the local paper.5  
 
Williams’ track record since 2010 gives an unfortunate testimonial as to how often such 
incidents can occur and the losses they can inflict. A March 2012 explosion in Springville 
Township, Michigan blew a hole in the roof of a Williams facility. Just two weeks after the 
previously referenced incident in Pennsylvania - in the same calendar month - an explosion at 
another Williams compressor station in New Jersey injured two construction workers sufficiently 
to require hospitalization and lead to minor injuries for 13 others.7,8 Yet another incident at an 
LNG facility in Washington less than two years later, in 2014, injured five workers and caused 
$69 million dollars in damage. Williams was less fortunate in that case as the fire and gas 
detectors at that facility had been disabled, unbeknownst to some of the personnel there, causing 
a delay in the activation of emergency shutdown systems.9 Williams also lost three workers in an 
explosion at a Gibson, Louisiana gas facility in October 2015 though that incident was not 
attributed to the compressor house.10 
 
Micropack was approached to assess the fire and gas detection requirements of a new 
compressor station a client was preparing to build. The client has had issues in the past with 
compressor fires at similar facilities including fires that went undetected for unacceptably long 
periods. The client therefore wanted to use a more rigorous design approach to verify the 
effectiveness of the design. This paper reviews the case study to provide an overview of the 
hazard mapping process, the results obtained and the benefits of such studies. 
 
Optical flame detection evolved out of the need to provide faster and more accurate fire detection 
and to better protect equipment and personnel than what was previously possible with traditional 
smoke and heat detection technologies. The technology has now advanced to the point that 1 ft2 
n-heptane test fires can be detected at distances of 200 ft or more in 10 seconds or less.2,3,6 
However, for detection to occur the fire must be within range and within the effective field of 
view of the detector, established through standardized testing methods. This therefore makes the 
 
 
design of detector layouts a critical and sometimes difficult process given the number of large 
and small obstructions in process areas that can prevent timely detection. 
 
In the absence of assessment tools, fire detection layouts using optical-based detectors have 
traditionally been based on expert judgement - “eye-balling” it. This can be problematic if the 
designer is unaware or misinformed as to the field of view or effective range of the detector 
being used as these vary widely in the industry. It can be very difficult to determine which of two 
(or more) possible layouts provides the best coverage, or if any of the proposed systems actually 
provide a level of coverage that the system owner would consider acceptable. Documenting and 
auditing the design, and identifying discrepancies between the system as designed vs as installed 
could also be difficult. Geographic coverage assessments (GCA), or Hazard mapping, evolved 
from the need to address these issues. Early assessment methods used 2D drawings, pencils and 
paper. More recently computers and 3D models have begun to be used to improve the accuracy 
of the studies. GCAs are now used with increasing frequency in the oil and gas industry and 
beyond to ensure system performance meets expectations and to demonstrate compliance with 
performance-based regulations. 
 
The methodology and target fire sizes used by Micropack and presented in this paper are 
consistent with the requirements for geographic coverage assessments in ISA TR 84.00.07.1 As 
part of this process, Micropack reviews site plot plans, area classification drawings, P&IDs, 
PFDs, and H&MBs. 
 
Model Sectioning, Conditioning and Review 
Geographic coverage assessments (GCA) can be carried out using 3D models or 2D plot plans. 
Assessments conducted using 3D models of the actual facility are, of course, considerably more 
detailed and accurate and, therefore, greatly preferred. However, detailed 3D computer models 
are a relatively recent addition to the engineering and design process and as such are often not 
available for older facilities. Since the project discussed here involved a GCA on a newly 
planned and designed compressor station a 3D model had been made and it was provided by the 
client for the assessment. A screenshot of the client provided 3D model, viewed in Navisworks 
Freedom, is shown in Figure 1. The client-provided model also includes the surrounding 
topography of the site. 
 
 
Figure 1: Complete 3D model of the onshore pumping station 
 
 
3D models are often quite large with entire, multi-deck offshore platforms in one 3D file. While 
this is good from a visual and design perspective, these large models - often made of tens if not 
hundreds of millions of polygons - can be extremely difficult to work with without very 
expensive, high-end computers, and may be impractical to work with even then. It is therefore 
usually necessary to section the model, making separate 3D files for each fire area, allowing each 
area to be assessed individually. 
 
For this project, the provided 3D model covered the entire pumping station. However, the scope 
of the assessment only covered the compressor house and a bunded area with several large 
storage tanks. The model was therefore sectioned to create separate model files for the 
compressor house and the bunded tank area with the out-of-scope areas removed. The sectioned 
models may require additional conditioning. This may include model simplification to reduce the 
number of polygons involved to make the software run faster and more smoothly. The model 
may also need to be converted into one of the file types supported by HazMap3D, the software 
used to conduct the GCA. These simplifications and conversions sometimes result in aberrations 
in the model and it is therefore necessary to review the final model, compare it to the original 
and confirm that the final model is acceptably accurate. 
 
The model for the compressor house required some additional modification. The compressor 
house is designed to contain 6 compressors, but one of the compressors will be added in the 
future. The pumping station will only have five compressors when it comes online and the 
provided 3D model only includes five compressors with an empty bay for a 6th, shown in Figure 
2. 
 
Figure 2: Vacant Bay in provided compressor house model 
The client wanted the fire and gas detection system to account for the 6th compressor so that a 
reassessment is not required when it is added. The 6th compressor was therefore added to the 
model. An image of the final model, as it appears in HazMap3D, is shown in Figure 3.  
Because the assessment model is created from the client-supplied model the coordinate system 
from the client model is preserved and used in the assessment model, even though large pieces of 
the original model have been removed. Figure 4 provides a look at a single compressor in the 
 
 
model, showing the level of detail that can be achieved in the 3D model, which allows for a more 
accurate assessment of coverage volumes. 
 
 
Figure 3: Bird’s eye view of the Final 3D compressor house assessment model, as shown in 
HazMap3D, viewed from the East. 
 
Figure 4: View of a single compressor, without the rest of the model, viewed in HazMap3D. 
Part of the model verification process touched on previously should include a confirmation that 
the model dimensions have been properly specified during import into HazMap3D and the 
facility is modeled as being the correct size. The compressor house for the pumping station is 
relatively large, measuring approximately 100 m by 21 m with a ceiling over 10 m high. Using 
the wrong units during model import could result in a model that’s only 8.5 m wide and 44 m 
long, if, for example, centimeters were used in place of inches during model import. 
Risk Ranking and Grading 
 
Pieces of equipment or process areas are typically assigned a risk ranking or grade as part of the 
geographic coverage assessment. The grade is assigned based on a combination of factors 
 
 
including the materials, temperatures and pressures involved, the value of the equipment and 
surrounding equipment and the likelihood that the fire will spread and damage surrounding 
equipment. Risk rankings typically include low risk (LR), medium risk (MR), and/or high risk 
(HR) grades. Special Risk (SR) categories may be created to address unusual hazards that require 
additional attention and scrutiny. 
 
Grades can be assigned by those conducting the GCA or specified by the client. In this case, the 
client assigned the risk grades based on their own in-house risk ranking and acceptance criteria. 
In cases where grades are assigned by the client Micropack still reviews relevant process 
information to ensure that no important fire hazards have been missed and will propose changes 
to the client grading where it is thought to be necessary or appropriate. 
 
For this compressor house the key components of the compressors were designated as MR with 
no LR or HR graded equipment in the compressor house. Figure 5 shows the graded volumes for 
the entire compressor house. Figure 6 shows the graded volumes on a single compressor for 
clarity. The MR grade has been applied to the compressor engine as well as the scrubber, suction 
and discharge bottle for all three stages of each compressor. This effectively assigns a MR grade 
to the entire volume around and between the major components to each compressor. The internal 
volume of the engines and each of the small vessels in the compressors were excluded from the 
flame assessment to prevent an underestimation of the coverage level provided.  
 
 




Figure 6: Graded volumes for a single compressor, viewed without the rest of the model in 
HazMap3D. 
Once assigned, the grade of a piece of equipment or area can determine or affect, the size of the 
target fire the system should be able to detect, the size of the graded volume or area, and the 
level of coverage that is desired. For example, a LR piece of equipment may require that a 250 
kW RHO fire trigger an alarm whereas an alarm is expected in response to a 50 kW RHO fire for 
MR equipment and 10 kW RHO for HR. Ninety percent coverage is usually desired with HR 
equipment where 60% or 70% is often considered acceptable for LR equipment. For this project, 
80% coverage with the ability to detect and alarm in response to a 100 kW RHO fire was 
expected for MR graded equipment. These are desired levels of coverage that are used as a target 
to shoot for or as a rule of thumb, not a rigid target that must always be met. 
The client specified fire and gas protection philosophy called for control action to occur with 
1ooN voting and for stepped-up control action to occur in response to a fire confirmed with 
2ooN voting. 
 
Detector Selection and Placement 
In some cases, 3D models of existing facilities will have flame and gas detectors incorporated 
into the 3D model. As the fire and gas detection system for this facility had not yet undergone 
formal design, no detectors have been installed and the detectors are not present in the model. 
Within the assessment software the flame detectors are represented by semi-transparent volumes 
that indicate the expected field of view of the detector. The size of this volume depends on the 
horizontal and vertical field of view and range of the specific detector being viewed as well as 
any desensitization factor that has been applied. 
 
The hazard mapping software used in this study includes a database of FM Global certified flame 
detectors commonly used in the industry and it can therefore accurately model a wide range of 
detectors that a client might have installed at a facility or which they may have selected for 
installation. If a client is using a detector that is not currently included in the software’s database 
this can usually be addressed through a minor software update. Where the type of detector is not 
known or where a detector model has not yet been selected, the software can model flame 
 
 
detectors as a generic single-frequency IR detector with a typical, conservative field of view and 
an effective range or 10 or 25 m. 
 
The client had elected to use the Drager Flame 3000 and Flame 5000 visual flame detectors in 
the compressor house. The decision was made to model all the detectors as Flame 5000 during 
the assessment. The Flame 5000 has a shorter detection range (44 m vs 60 m) as well as 
narrower horizontal and vertical fields of view as compared to the Flame 3000, but offers the 
possibility of supplying live video feeds to the control room and video recording of alarm events, 
which the Flame 3000 does not.2,3 Therefore, modeling all the detectors as a Flame 5000 
provides the maximum number of possible video feeds to the control center while also providing 
a conservative assessment of the provided coverage. Should the client decide to install Flame 
3000s instead, higher coverage levels would be expected. 
 
The client fire and gas protection philosophy calls for two detectors to be installed for each 
compressor, and would therefore call for twelve detectors to be used to monitor this compressor 
house. However, the layout of the compressors appeared to offer the potential for a smaller 
number of detectors to be used while still obtaining acceptable coverage. The assessment process 
allows for these options to be explored and for the coverage provided by competing layouts to be 
compared objectively. This is done by first modeling the existing or currently proposed detector 
layout, typically referred to as the baseline design. The software provides detailed information of 
the level of coverage, where gaps in coverage exist, and how much each detector contributes to 
the overall level of coverage. This information can then be used to modify or fine-tune the layout 
to address any unacceptable gaps in coverage or eliminate excessive redundancy. 
 
Baseline Assessment Results 
As the compressor station has not yet been built, there was no detailed information on the 
location and orientation of each detector in the client-proposed baseline layout. Because of this, 
the detectors were placed by Micropack based on information provided by the client in the 
project kick-off meeting. Twelve Drager Flame 5000 detectors were modeled in the compressor 
house as being mounted 8 m above the local deck (ALD) with a 10° downward tilt relative to the 
horizontal. Normal practice calls for the detectors to be positioned approximately 3 to 4 m ALD 
to allow for them to be installed and replaced using portable ladders. However, the detectors 
have been placed higher in this case because the compressors are also elevated. At an elevation 
of 8 m ALD the detectors can still be easily field tested from the ground using portable LED test 
lights. The detectors were situated so that they would be mounted to steel structural supports 
along the Eastern wall of the compressor house. These were thought to be the best available 
mounting points to avoid issues with excessive vibration. 
 
The detectors were specified to face at a 45° angle relative to the eastern wall with six oriented 
towards the Northwest and six oriented towards the Southwest. Figure 7 shows the overlapping 
field of views for the detectors in the compressor house. The detectors are modeled with an 
effective viewing distance of 27.8 m (63% of the maximum) to account for desensitization. This 




Figure 7: Detector Field of view for baseline detector arrangement. 
This twelve-detector arrangement yielded a 2ooN coverage of almost 78% with 1ooN coverage 
for an additional 11% of the graded volume. The remaining eleven percent of the graded volume, 
mostly along the back and underside of the compressors had no coverage. Much of this area is 
difficult to obtain a clear line-of-sight to these areas because of obstruction from piping and 
equipment and the placement of additional detectors provide minimal improvements to coverage. 
For context, a 24-detector layout - using 12 additional detectors along the Western wall of the 
compressor house at 5 m ALD - only achieves 1ooN coverage for 92.8% of the graded volume 
and leaves 7.2% uncovered. It is hard to imagine many would argue a 5% improvement to 1ooN 
coverage is worth the addition of 1 or 2 detectors, much less 12, when the system already meets 
specified performance targets. 
 
Figure 8 shows a graphical depiction of the detector coverage for the baseline layout overlaid 
onto the 3D model for one of the compressors. The baseline configuration can be seen to provide 
very good coverage of the upper and eastern facing sides of the compressor with coverage levels 
dropping towards the rear and underside of the compressor. 
 
Figure 8: Visual depiction of geographic assessment result for the Southernmost compressor 
shown in HazMap3D. 
 
 
Table 1 provides a numerical breakdown of the overall coverage and the contribution of each 
detector to the overall system. Pan and Tilt indicate the orientation of the detector. Pan ranges 
from 0 to 360 degrees with 0 degrees corresponding to an Eastern orientation. The tilt indicates 
the angle relative to the horizontal with a downward tilt being considered positive - flame 
detectors normally have a downward tilt of between 10 and 40 degrees. Because the assessment 
model is generated from the client-supplied model, the coordinates of the detector are defined 
and given using the same coordinates used in the client-model with the elevation defined relative 
to the local deck. 
 
Table 1: Detector contributions to system coverage for the baseline layout 
  Pan (°) Tilt (°) Individual 1ooN 2ooN >2ooN 
All Detectors   
 
88.8 77.8 62.0 
Det01 135 10 21.5 86.7 74.6 57.4 
Det02 225 10 10.4 88.4 76.1 58.3 
Det03 135 10 27.8 88.0 74.7 57.6 
Det04 225 10 20.7 88.3 75.9 55.7 
Det05 135 10 28.9 88.1 75.3 57.0 
Det06 225 10 27.8 88.3 75.6 56.6 
Det07 135 10 30.2 88.1 75.4 55.8 
Det08 225 10 29.3 88.1 74.8 57.7 
Det09 135 10 23.7 88.0 75.2 54.3 
Det10 225 10 30.3 87.8 73.9 57.7 
Det11 135 10 12.0 88.2 75.8 57.1 
Det12 225 10 23.3 86.1 74.6 56.5 
 
The 1ooN and 2ooN coverage columns in Table 1 give the percentage of the graded area that 
achieves that level of coverage if that detector is removed from the system. For example, if 
Det01 is eliminated, 2ooN coverage drops from 77.8% to 74.6%.  
Based on Table 1, the baseline layout generated based on client practices detailed in their fire 
and gas protection philosophy and the project kick-off meeting is a good one. It meets and 
exceeds the 80% coverage level expected for MR areas with 1ooN coverage and nearly meets it 
with 2ooN coverage. The numerical breakdown in Table 1 also shows that the system has a 
sufficient level of redundancy that the failure or loss of any one detector does not significantly 
reduce overall coverage and does not cause the system to drop below the 80% coverage expected 
of it. 
That 1ooN coverage for the targeted fire size is not achieved for 11% of the graded volume is not 
as concerning as it may at first appear given the size and location of the gaps, and the types of 
fires expected. The compressors handle high pressure gas. Jet fires are the most likely fire for the 
system to detect. Pool fires will not occur and fires on the underside of the compressor - where 
the largest gaps in coverage occur - are relatively unlikely. The remaining coverage gaps are 
relatively small and a high-pressure jet fire is unlikely to be able to “hide” within those small 
volumes. 
Based on this, the baseline layout is a well-designed system. However, it may not represent an 
optimal layout. Table 1 suggests that it may be possible to eliminate several detectors with 
minimal loss of system performance. This can be inferred from that fact that Table 1 shows 
 
 
3ooN coverage is achieved for 62% of the graded volume and the 3ooN coverage remains over 
50% even with the loss of any single detector. 
Detector Layout Optimization 
Based on Table 1, Det02, Det04, Det06, and Det11 contribute relatively little to the overall 
system coverage and can likely be eliminated. Det05, Det07 and Det08 can also be seen to 
contribute only marginally to the overall coverage. Based on this, detectors Det02, Det04, Det08, 
and Det11 were removed and a new assessment was run. Table 2 shows the overall coverage 
levels and individual contributions of each detector for the reduced 8 detector layout. 
Table 2: Detector contributions to system coverage for the 8-detector layout 
  Pan (°) Tilt (°) Individual 1ooN 2ooN >2ooN 
All Detectors  10 
 
86.3 65.2 41.6 
Det01 135 10 21.5 79.9 57.1 34.6 
Det03 135 10 27.8 85.1 59.7 28.9 
Det05 135 10 28.9 85.5 61.4 30.6 
Det06 225 10 27.8 82.6 56.8 30.5 
Det07 135 10 30.2 85.2 60.7 29.2 
Det09 135 10 23.7 84.8 58.4 34.3 
Det10 225 10 30.3 83.9 60.9 34.6 
Det12 225 10 23.3 82.5 59.3 35.4 
 
The elimination of these four detectors resulted in an 8-detector layout with 2ooN coverage for 
65% of the graded area and 1ooN coverage over an additional 21%, for a total 1ooN coverage of 
86%. While the coverage provided is not as comprehensive as that provided by the baseline 
layout, the achieved coverage level still exceeds the desired coverage level of 80% specified by 
the client and does so with 33% fewer detectors. This 33% reduction in the number of detectors 
only reduces 1ooN coverage by 2% of the graded volume. Most of the loss of 2ooN coverage 
was seen on the outer sides of the Northernmost and Southernmost detectors. Figure 9 shows the 
coverage level on the southern side of the southernmost detector. While the level of redundant 
coverage in the system has been significantly reduced, Table 2 shows that the system can still 
tolerate the loss of any single detector while still maintaining 1ooN coverage at or above the 80% 
level desired by the client. The loss of Det01 has by far the most significant impact on system 
1ooN coverage with the loss of Det06 causing the largest reduction in 2ooN coverage. The 
reduction in redundant coverage can be seen mostly clearly in Table 2 with the 20% reduction in 
3ooN coverage as compared to the baseline layout. 
Given that the detectors are designed to indicate a fault state and report a detected fault to the 
control room, and given the very high reliability of the detectors, it’s considered unlikely that 
two or more of the eight detectors will be in fault at the same time provided reasonable 




Figure 9: Coverage loss on the Southern side of the Southernmost detector shown in HazMap3D 
 
Revision Based on Client Feedback 
Soliciting client comments on and approval of the proposed changes is a vital part of any process 
that involves modifications to safety critical systems. Even if the system satisfies company 
specific or project specific performance goals, concerns may arise from the client, who may want 
to go beyond specified minimum coverage goals for any of a number of reasons. 
While the 8-detector layout met the targeted performance level and the client was pleased by the 
prospect of reducing the detector count, the client was concerned about the gaps in 2ooN 
coverage at the far sides of the building and asked that two detectors be added to address the 
large gaps in 2ooN coverage on sides the Northernmost and Southernmost compressors. 
 
Detectors were added to the Northwest and Southwest corners of the compressor house oriented 
towards these 2ooN coverage gaps, situated approximately 6 m ALD. The location and fields of 
view of these additional detectors is shown in Figure 10. This placement ideally situated these 
detectors to close the gaps in 2ooN detection on the sides of these compressors while also 
keeping them geographically separated from the detectors in the northeast and southeast corners 
of the compressor house. 
 
 
Figure 10: Field of view for detectors located in the Northwestern and Southwestern corners of 
the compressor house. 
 
 
The additional detectors addressed the gaps in 2ooN coverage, resulting in a 10-detector layout 
that provided almost 74% 2ooN cover and over 88% 1ooN coverage, nearly matching the 
coverage levels achieved in the baseline layout - the two layouts are within 0.5% of each other 
for 1ooN coverage - while achieving a 16% reduction in detector count. Table 3 provides a 
breakdown of the layout and the coverages provided. 
 
Table 3: Detector contributions to system coverage for the 10-detector layout 
  Pan (°) Tilt (°) Individual 1ooN 2ooN >2ooN 
All Detectors   
 
88.5 74.2 50.5 
Det01 135 10 21.5 87.3 65.6 40.0 
Det03 135 10 27.8 87.3 69.6 37.9 
Det05 135 10 28.9 87.7 70.4 39.5 
Det06 225 10 27.8 85.4 68.9 36.7 
Det07 135 10 30.2 87.4 70.0 40.7 
Det09 135 10 23.7 87.3 70.9 42.5 
Det10 225 10 30.3 86.0 70.2 43.5 
Det12 225 10 23.3 87.3 69.6 43.4 
Det13 300 10 12.2 87.5 71.1 46.4 
Det14 60 10 13.0 87.4 68.2 45.8 
 
The hazard mapping software makes assessments like this possible by allowing an objective 
assessment of coverage levels provided for target fires of specified sizes. It allows practitioners 
to easily see where coverage gaps exist and then adjust detector locations or type or add 
additional detectors to address gaps. By providing information on the contribution each detector 
makes to the overall system performance, the software also makes it significantly easier to 
identify unnecessary detectors, detectors that are vital to overall system performance, and where 
more or less redundancy may be needed. 
 
One of the chief hurdles that any engineering study or project has to overcome before being 
approved is justifying the expenditure of funds and resources. Each Drager Flame 5000 costs 
approximately $3,000. The installed cost of each detector can exceed $10,000 and each detector 
then incurs additional expense over it’s lifetime for testing and maintenance, albeit a relatively 
small amount given the ease of testing and the high reliability of the device. Because of this, it 
can be relatively easy for a hazard mapping study to pay for itself in the form of reduced detector 
counts and costs. The cost of the system and the assessment both pale, however, in comparison 
to the risk of a fire going undetected and being allowed to propagate by a poorly designed 
detection system. With valuable equipment on the line, it pays to have a well-designed system 
based on an assessment by qualified engineers. 
The effect of detector FOV on system coverage 
 
The ability of the software to use the real, verified by test data, field of view and effective range 
of the detectors in conducting the assessment is critical to the quality of the assessment. The 
impact that detector field of view and range has on the effectiveness of the overall system and 
the number of detectors required to achieve adequate coverage deserves special emphasis. To 
 
 
demonstrate this point, Table 4 lists the coverage levels achieved by the 10-detector system using 
the Flame 5000, and Flame 3000. 
 
Table 4: Coverage levels obtained using different detectors with the proposed 10-detector 
layout. 
Detector Type 1ooN 2ooN >2ooN 
Draeger Flame 3000 89.9 79.5 60.4 
Draeger Flame 5000 88.5 74.2 50.5 
 
Table 4 shows that the same layout - with no change in the number of detectors or the position of 
any detector - can provide significantly different coverage levels when different detector models 
are used, highlighting the importance of accurately accounting for field of view and range. 
Operators should be aware of this during the initial design and assessment of the system as well 
as during any MOC involving the replacement of a detector. The wider field of view and longer 
range of the Flame 3000 allows it to provide 2ooN coverage to an additional 5% of the graded 
volume when compared to the coverage provided by the Flame 5000. This is largely the result of 
the Flame 3000 having a wider horizontal field of view - 120° versus 90° for the Flame 5000. 
 
Conclusion 
The authors have provided a flame detection assessment case study for the purposes of detailing 
the hazard mapping process, also called a geographic coverage assessment, conducted in a 
manner consistent with the guidance provided in ISA TR 84.00.07. A client provided 3D model 
was modified as necessary for the assessment process and imported into the assessment software. 
Grades were assigned to hazardous equipment containing flammable hydrocarbons and a 
baseline detector layout was generated based on the client’s fire and gas protection philosophy 
and discussion with the client. The baseline layout was then assessed, and modifications were 
proposed to reduce excessive redundancies in the system and thereby reduce the installation, 
operating and maintenance costs associated with the system. This case study demonstrates the 
ability of hazard mapping, assisted with software designed for such studies, allow for the rapid 
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